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
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by 
designation. 
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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROSENTHAL, District Judge: 
 
This appeal arises out of the intersection of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  
The issue is whether a debt collector’s letter and notice 
requesting an examination under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 2004 and offering to settle a debt, sent in a pending 
bankruptcy in contemplation of an adversary proceeding to 
challenge dischargeability, can be the basis for liability under 
the FDCPA.   
 
A law firm, Weinstein & Riley, P.S., sent the letter and 
attached notice at issue on behalf of FIA Card Services, N.A., 
to both appellants, bankruptcy debtors Stacey Helene and 
Robert Maxwell Simon, through their bankruptcy counsel.  
The District Court dismissed the Simons’ FDCPA suit arising 
from the letter and notice under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court held that the 
Bankruptcy Code provided the exclusive remedy for the 
alleged violations and precluded the FDCPA claims.  The 
District Court also held that even if the FDCPA claims were 
not precluded, the Simons’ complaint did not allege sufficient 
facts to state a claim.  The Simons appealed.  We will affirm 
in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
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I. Background 
On December 30, 2010, the Simons filed for 
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84, in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of New Jersey.  In re Simon, No. 10-
50052 (Bankr. D.N.J. filed Dec. 30, 2010). The schedules 
submitted to the Bankruptcy Court identified an unsecured, 
nonpriority claim credit-card debt owed to Bank of America 
(now FIA).  FIA retained Weinstein & Riley to represent it in 
the Simons’ bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
 On January 28, 2011, Weinstein & Riley sent the letter 
and attached notice to both Mr. and Mrs. Simon through their 
bankruptcy counsel.  The letter stated that FIA was 
considering filing an adversary proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 
523 to challenge the dischargeability of the credit-card debt.  
The letter included an offer to forego an adversary proceeding 
if the Simons stipulated that the credit-card debt was 
nondischargeable or if they agreed to pay a reduced amount 
to settle the debt.  The letter stated that a Rule 2004 
examination to gather information for filing an adversary 
proceeding had been scheduled for February 28, 2011, but 
that Weinstein & Riley was open to “discuss[ing] with your 
client whether the matter can be resolved without conducting 
the examination and/or to reschedule it for an informal 
telephone conference at a mutually agreeable time prior to the 
bar date.”  The bottom of the letter set out additional 
information about how to challenge the debt “[i]n the event 
that this letter is governed by the FDCPA.”   
 
 Attached to the letter was a document entitled 
“NOTICE OF EXAMINATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
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F.R.B.P. 2004 AND LOCAL RULE 2004-1.”  The notice 
identified the date and time for the Rule 2004 examinations 
and the place as Weinstein & Riley’s offices in New York 
City or “upon written request, at an alternate location to be 
agreed upon by the parties.”  The notice included a statement 
that the Simons were to bring specified documents to the Rule 
2004 examinations.
1
  The notice stated that “[p]ursuant to 
Local Rule 16, no order shall be necessary.”  The Simons 
alleged, and the appellees acknowledged at oral argument, 
that the notice was subject to the requirements for a subpoena 
                                              
1  
 The documents the Simons were to bring included: (1) 
“[a]ll cancelled checks and checking account statements 
maintained by Debtor for the one (1) year period prior to the 
date the Debtor filed bankruptcy”; (2) “[a]ll books and 
records evidencing Debtor’s income, including payroll 
statements, W-2 forms and other documentary evidence of 
income, for the years 2008 and 2009”; (3) “[f]ederal tax 
returns filed by Debtor for the taxable years 2007, 2008, and 
2009”; (4) “[a]ll checks, invoices, receipts of payments and 
statements for the Debtor and Debtor’s personal expenses, 
including, but not limited to credit card statements, mortgage 
or rental payments, utility bills, insurance premiums, 
automobile and/or transportation expenses, entertainment and 
recreational expenses, clothing expenses, capital gains and 
losses, gambling debts, food expenses, or medical and drug 
expenses, for the one (1) year period prior to the date the 
Debtor filed for bankruptcy”; and (5) “[a]ll financial 
statements, inventories, and schedules reflecting Debtor’s 
assets, liabilities and net worth, whether prepared by Debtor 
or on Debtor’s behalf, for the one (1) year period prior to the 
date Debtor filed for bankruptcy.”  
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under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9016 and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. 
 
 At the bottom of the subpoena was a certificate signed 
by a Weinstein & Riley attorney.  The certificate stated that 
“a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been mailed on 
January 28, 2011 to the above address.”  Two addresses were 
listed: the Simons’ home in New Jersey and their bankruptcy 
counsel’s office.  The Simons allege that they did not receive 
a copy at their home address and that Weinstein & Riley did 
not in fact send a copy there.  The Simons’ bankruptcy 
counsel received the copies sent to his office.  
 
 The Simons filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court to 
quash the Rule 2004 examination notices on the ground that 
they failed to comply with the Bankruptcy Rule 9016 and 
Civil Rule 45 subpoena requirements.  On February 23, 2011, 
the Simons filed an adversary proceeding asserting FDCPA 
claims against FIA and Weinstein & Riley.  The Bankruptcy 
Court quashed the Rule 2004 examination notices.  The 
Bankruptcy Court later ruled that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the FDCPA claims and dismissed them 
without prejudice.   
 
 The Simons then sued FIA and Weinstein & Riley in 
the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
They alleged that the letters and subpoenas violated the 
FDCPA prohibition on false, deceptive, and misleading debt-
collection practices under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), (11), and 
(13).  The appellees moved to dismiss on three grounds: (1) 
the FDCPA claim was precluded by the Bankruptcy Court’s 
earlier dismissal of the adversary proceeding the Simons had 
filed; (2) the complaint did not state a claim; and (3) the 
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allegations from which the FDCPA claims arose were 
governed exclusively by the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
 On July 16, 2012, the District Court dismissed the 
FDCPA suit, with prejudice, stating that the “FDCPA claims 
[were] precluded by the Bankruptcy Code” and that the 
complaint “does not appear to set forth sufficient factual 
allegations to state a claim” under the FDCPA.  Simon v. FIA 
Card Servs., N.A., Civ. No. 12-518, 2012 WL 2891080, at 
*4 (D.N.J. 2012). 
 
 The Simons timely appealed from the dismissal order.
2
 
II. The Standard of Review 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be 
granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those 
allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).  We 
review de novo an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  
Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 765 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
2
   The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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III. Analysis 
A. Whether the Complaint Stated Claims Under 
the FDCPA 
 
Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors 
from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation 
or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”  The 
Simons alleged that the letter and notice violated § 1692e(5), 
(11), and (13).  Section 1692e(5) states that a debt collector 
may not make a “threat to take any action that cannot legally 
be taken or that is not intended to be taken.”  Section 
1692e(13) prohibits a debt collector from making a “false 
representation or implication that documents are legal 
process.”   
 
The Simons alleged that by sending the letter and 
attached notice, Weinstein & Reilly and FIA violated § 
1692e(5) and (13) in four ways: 
 
• By intentionally failing to send the letter and subpoena 
to the Simons and instead sending the documents to 
their attorney, violating Civil Rule 45(b)(1)’s 
requirement that subpoenas be served directly on the 
individuals subpoenaed. 
 
• By specifying the location for the Rule 2004 
examinations as the Weinstein & Riley office in New 
York, rather than in New Jersey.  The Simons alleged 
that this violated Civil Rule 45(a)(2)(B)’s requirement 
that a subpoena be issued “from the court for the 
district where the deposition is to be taken.” 
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• By failing to include in the subpoena the text of Civil 
Rule 45(c) and (d), as Civil Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iv) 
requires. 
 
• By failing to include in the subpoena the method of 
recording the Rule 2004 examinations, as Civil Rule 
45(a)(1)(B) requires.  
 
Additionally, the Simons allege that Weinstein & Riley 
violated the FDCPA by failing to include the “mini-Miranda” 
warning required under § 1692e(11).  Under that section, a 
debt collector must disclose in the initial communication with 
the debtor that “the debt collector is attempting to collect a 
debt and that any information obtained will be used for that 
purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 
 
1. The Argument that the FDCPA Did Not 
Apply Because There Was No 
“Communication” Attempting to Collect 
a Debt   
 
The appellees generally contend that the FDCPA 
claims should be dismissed on the ground that the letter and 
notice sent to the Simons did not “attempt to collect a debt” 
under the statute because there was no demand for payment.  
Instead, the appellees contend, the letter offered to “discuss a 
possible [nondischargeability] claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
523.”  Courts have not construed the FDCPA so narrowly. 
 
The FDCPA regulates “debt collection” without 
defining that term.  The FDCPA states that “to be liable under 
the statute’s substantive provisions, a debt collector’s targeted 
conduct must have been taken ‘in connection with the 
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collection of any debt,’ e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)–(b), 
1692d, 1692e, 1692g, or in order ‘to collect any debt,’ id. § 
1692f.”  Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 459–
60 (6th Cir. 2013).  The FDCPA does define three other 
relevant terms:  
 
 “Debt” means “any obligation or alleged obligation of 
a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction 
in which the money, property, insurance, or services 
which are the subject of the transaction are primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes, whether 
or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.”   
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).   
 
 “Debt collector” means a person “in any business the 
principal purpose of which is the collection of any 
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, 
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to 
be owed or due another.”  Id., § 1692a(6).   
 
 “Communication” means “the conveying of 
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to 
any person through any medium.”  Id., § 1692a(2). 
 
The Supreme Court held in Heintz v. Jenkins that a 
“debt collector” includes an attorney who “‘regularly’ 
engage[s] in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when 
that activity consists of litigation.”  514 U.S. 291, 299 
(1995).
3
  The Simons’ claims cannot be dismissed on the 
                                              
3
  The Court in Heintz noted that, as originally passed, the 
FDCPA exempted attorneys by providing that “debt 
collector” did not include “‘any attorney-at-law collecting a 
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ground that Weinstein & Riley’s actions did not amount to 
“debt collection” covered by the FDCPA. 
 
Nor can the Simons’ FDCPA claims be dismissed on 
the ground that the letter and notice were not 
“communications” under the statute.  In Allen ex rel. Martin 
v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2011), we 
addressed whether a letter sent by a bank’s attorneys met the 
FDCPA requirement for a “communication.”  Id. at 368 n.5 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2)).  The bank argued that the letter 
was not an actionable FDCPA “communication” because it 
did not make a demand for payment.  We rejected that 
argument and noted that a “communication” need only 
convey “‘information regarding a debt’ and is not limited to 
specific requests for payment.”  Id. (quoting § 1692a(2)). 
 
Opinions from other circuits provide further support 
for applying the FDCPA to debt collectors’ communications 
to debtors even if there is even if there is no explicit demand 
for payment.  In Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, the 
Seventh Circuit addressed whether two letters to a debtor who 
                                                                                                     
debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client.’”  
514 U.S. at 294 (quoting Pub. L. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 
874, 875).  In 1986, before Heintz was decided, Congress 
repealed the attorney exemption.  Pub. L. 99-361, 100 Stat. 
768.  After Heintz, Congress amended § 1692e(11) to exempt 
any “formal pleading made in connection with a legal action” 
from the FDCPA’s notice requirements.  15 U.S.C. § 
1692e(11), as amended Pub. L. 104–208, § 2305(a), 110 Stat. 
3009, 3009–425 (1996).  Congress did not otherwise limit the 
FDCPA’s applicability to lawyers using litigation to collect 
debts. 
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had fallen behind on her mortgage payments could be the 
basis for FDCPA claims.  614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010).  The 
letters, sent by or on behalf of a loan servicer, offered to 
discuss ways the debtor could avoid foreclosure and asked for 
the debtor’s detailed, current financial information.  The 
Seventh Circuit held that the letters were sent “in connection 
with the collection of [a] debt” under § 1692e.  Id. at 385.  
The court explained that “[t]he absence of a demand for 
payment is just one of several factors that come into play in 
the commonsense inquiry of whether a communication from a 
debt collector is made in connection with the collection of 
any debt.”  Id.  Noting that the debtor was in default, no 
forbearance agreement was in place, and the letters offered to 
discuss foreclosure alternatives and requested financial 
information, the court concluded that the first of the letters 
was the “opening communication in an attempt to collect [the 
debtor’s] defaulted home loan — by settlement or otherwise.  
Though it did not explicitly ask for payment, it was an offer 
to discuss [the debtor’s] repayment options, which qualifies 
as a communication in connection with an attempt to collect a 
debt.”  Id. at 386.  
 
The Sixth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach in Grden v. Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 
169 (6th Cir. 2011).  In Grden, a law firm filed a state-court 
debt-collection action.  The firm sent the debtor a letter with 
an attachment that appeared to be a default-judgment motion.  
The debtor had not missed the deadline for answering the 
complaint.  When the debtor called the law firm, it allegedly 
provided him with an incorrect account balance.  The debtor 
filed an FDCPA claim.  The law firm moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the letter with the attachment 
and telephone call were not communications that attempted to 
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collect a debt.  The Sixth Circuit held that “for a 
communication to be in connection with the collection of a 
debt, an animating purpose of the communication must be to 
induce payment by the debtor.”  Id. at 173 (citing Gburek, 
614 F.3d at 385).  “[A] letter that is not itself a collection 
attempt, but that aims to make . . . such an attempt more 
likely to succeed, is one that has the requisite connection.”  
Id.  The letter and document appearing to be a default-
judgment motion gave rise to an FDCPA claim.  The 
telephone call, however, did not give rise to an FDCPA claim 
because the debtor had initiated the call, and the statements 
by the person answering were “merely a ministerial response 
to a debtor inquiry, rather than part of a strategy to make 
payment more likely.”  Id. 
 
Other circuits considering related questions have 
similarly held that the FDCPA applies to litigation-related 
activities that do not include an explicit demand for payment 
when the general purpose is to collect payment.  See, e.g., 
McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 
F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The district court correctly 
held that [the defendant’s] service of false requests for 
admission violated the FDCPA as a matter of law.”); Sayyed 
v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 228, 230–32 (4th Cir. 
2007) (holding that the FDCPA applied to allegedly 
erroneous statements made in interrogatories and a summary 
judgment motion during the course of a state-court debt-
collection suit). 
 
 Given Allen’s broad gloss on “communication” and the 
consistent analysis from other circuits described above, we 
reject the appellees’ argument that the letter and subpoena 
Weinstein & Riley sent each appellant was not a 
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“communication” from a “debt collector” made “in 
connection with the collection of [a] debt.”  The letters stated 
that the Simons had defaulted on their credit obligations; FIA 
was considering filing adversary proceedings under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523 to challenge the dischargeability of their debt; Rule 
2004 examinations were scheduled to gather information 
about dischargeability; and the Simons were to bring personal 
financial information and documents to the Rule 2004 
examinations.  The letters offered the Simons a way to avoid 
the Rule 2004 examinations and adversary proceedings by 
paying a reduced amount to settle the debt or by stipulating 
that the debt was nondischargeable.  The letter and notice 
were an attempt to collect the Simons’ debt through the 
alternatives of settlement — including by partial payment — 
or gathering information to challenge dischargeability.  The 
absence of an explicit payment demand does not take the 
communication outside the FDCPA.
4
 
                                              
4
 The appellees argue that the Simons’ FDCPA claims fail 
because the complaint did not sufficiently allege facts 
showing that they were “consumers” under the FDCPA.  A 
“consumer” means “any natural person obligated or allegedly 
obligated to pay any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).  Because 
the asserted failure to plead “consumer” status was raised as a 
basis to dismiss for the first time on appeal, we need not 
address it.  We do note that had the District Court been given 
the opportunity to address this claim and dismissed on this 
basis, the dismissal likely would have been with leave to 
amend.  See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 
519, 545 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Leave to amend should be freely 
given when justice so requires, including for a curative 
amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable 
or futile.”).   
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2. The Arguments that the Complaint Did 
Not Allege an FDCPA Claim    
 
a. The FDCPA Claims Based on Alleged 
Violations of Bankruptcy Rule 9016 
and Civil Rule 45   
 
The District Court found that several of the Simons’ 
specific FDCPA allegations were contradicted by the 
language of the subpoenas Weinstein & Riley sent.
5
  The 
District Court rejected the Simons’ § 1692e(5) and (13) 
claims that the appellees violated the FDCPA because the 
subpoenas failed to disclose the method for recording the 
examination.  The District Court noted that the statement in 
both subpoenas that “a certified court reporter or any other 
Notary Public or officer authorized by law to take 
                                                                                                     
     The appellees also raise for the first time on appeal the 
sufficiency of the Simons’ allegations that Weinstein & Riley 
or FIA was a “debt collector” under the FDCPA.  While 
attorneys such as Weinstein & Riley, who regularly use 
litigation to collect consumer debts owed to others are “debt 
collectors,” Heintz, 514 U.S. 291, original creditors are not, 
see Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Although this issue was not raised below and is 
not properly before us, whether FIA is a “debt collector” or a 
creditor may be an issue addressed on remand. 
 
5
  The Simons attached the letter and notice directed to each 
of them to their complaint.  The letter and notice was properly 
considered by the District Court under Rule 12(b)(6) and are 
before us on appeal.  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt 
Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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depositions” would be used for the Rule 2004 examinations 
was sufficient.  Simon, 2012 WL 2891080, at *5.  We will 
affirm this conclusion, but on a different ground.  Cardona v. 
Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We may 
affirm a district court for any reason supported by the record.” 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).  We find 
that the failure to specify the recording method in the 
subpoena did not violate Bankruptcy Rule 9016 or Civil Rule 
45.   
 
Bankruptcy Rule 9016 provides that Civil Rule 45 
applies to subpoenas issued in bankruptcy cases.  Civil Rule 
45(a)(1)(B) requires that “[a] subpoena commanding 
attendance at a deposition must state the method for recording 
the testimony” and applies to subpoenas for depositions.  
Courts have recognized that a Rule 2004 examination differs 
from a deposition, serving different purposes and subject to 
different procedures.
6
  See, e.g., In re J & R Trucking, Inc., 
                                              
6
    Rule 2004 examinations, “typically implemented in the 
pre-litigation stage of a bankruptcy case, are subject to few of 
the procedural safeguards normally applicable to discovery 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  In re Bakalis, 
199 B.R. 443, 447 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also In re 
Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 203 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“As [Rule] 2004 is meant to give the 
inquiring party broad power to investigate the estate, it does 
not provide the procedural safeguards offered by [Bankruptcy 
Rule] 7026.  For example, under a [Rule] 2004 examination, a 
witness has no general right to representation by counsel, and 
the right to object to immaterial or improper questions is 
limited.” (citations omitted)); In re Coffee Cupboard, Inc., 
128 B.R. 509, 516 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“These 
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431 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Although a Rule 
2004 examination is obviously an investigatory device and it 
is conducted under oath, it should not be confused with 
discovery or a discovery deposition.”).  Bankruptcy Rule 
2004(c) provides that “the attendance of an entity for 
examination . . . may be compelled as provided in Rule 9016 
for the attendance of a witness at a hearing or trial.”  Civil 
Rule 45 does not require a subpoena for attendance at a 
hearing or trial to include a notice of the recording method.  
Civil Rule 45(a)(1)(B) and Bankruptcy Rule 9016 did not 
require the subpoenas Weinstein & Reilly sent to state the 
method for recording the Rule 2004 examinations.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the dismissal of the § 1692e(5) 
and (13) claims because there was no failure to comply with 
the rules. 
 
                                                                                                     
examinations have been likened and countenanced as fishing 
expeditions and inquisitions where procedural safeguards of 
witnesses are at a minimum.” (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); In re Wilcher, 56 B.R. 428, 434 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1985) (“The proper mode of discovery which 
ordinarily must be utilized against a third party who may be 
liable to the bankruptcy estate for various wrongful acts is 
contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provide numerous procedural safeguards against unfairness to 
the party from which discovery is sought. . . .  By contrast, 
the procedural safeguards provided by Bankruptcy Rule 2004 
are minimal.”).  At least one court has found that the 
Bankruptcy Rules do not “require [Rule 2004] examinations 
to be transcribed or transcripts to be filed.”  In re Thow, 392 
B.R. 860, 867 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2007). 
18 
 
The District Court also dismissed the Simons’ claims 
that the appellees violated § 1692e(5) and (13) of the FDCPA 
by issuing the subpoenas from the District of New Jersey for 
Rule 2004 examinations to be held in the Southern District of 
New York.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2)(A) (providing that a 
subpoena must issue “from the court for the district where the 
hearing or trial is to be held”).  The District Court dismissed 
this FDCPA claim on the basis that there was no underlying 
rule violation, finding that the subpoenas did not “compel” 
the Simons to appear only in New York, as they alleged.  The 
subpoenas stated that the examinations could take place 
“upon written request, at an alternate location to be agreed 
upon by the parties.”  The Simons did not address on appeal 
the District Court’s ground for dismissing this claim, and we 
find no basis for reversal.  We will affirm the dismissal of this 
claim. 
 
The District Court did not find, and the appellees do 
not argue, that the subpoenas met Civil Rule 45’s 
requirements that they be served directly on the individuals 
subpoenaed and include the text of Civil Rule 45(c) and (d).  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1); (a)(1)(A)(iv).  The District Court 
instead dismissed the § 1692e(5) and (13) claims arising from 
the violations of Civil Rule 45 on the basis of preclusion. The 
District Court dismissed the remaining FDCPA claim under 
§ 1692e(11) on the basis that it failed to state a claim.  This 
FDCPA claim, unlike the § 1692e(5) and (13) claims, does 
not depend on an underlying alleged violation of the 
Bankruptcy Rules. 
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b. The FDCPA Claim Based on the 
Failure to Include the “Mini-Miranda” 
Warning 
 
The District Court found that the letter sent to the 
Simons’ bankruptcy counsel did not violate the FDCPA 
because it “‘simply advised the attorney for the debtor that 
the Defendant debt collection agency believed that the debt 
might be non-dischargeable and it would like to settle the 
matter if the attorney for the debtor did not believe that there 
was a defense to the claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).’”  
Simon, 2012 WL 2891080, at *5 (quoting Villegas v. 
Weinstein & Riley, P.S., 723 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760–61 (M.D. 
Pa. 2010)).  The Villegas court first held that the FDCPA does 
not apply to a debt collector’s communications to a debtor’s 
attorney.  The court then held that to the extent that the 
FDCPA applies to such communications, they should be 
analyzed under a “competent lawyer” standard, not the “least 
sophisticated debtor” standard that ordinarily applies to a debt 
collector’s communications with a debtor.  See Lesher v. Law 
Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“[W]e analyze communications from lenders to 
debtors from the perspective of the least sophisticated 
debtor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Villegas 
court concluded that under the “competent lawyer” standard, 
a letter advising the debtor’s bankruptcy counsel of the desire 
to settle a potential adversary complaint did not violate the 
FDCPA.   Villegas, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 760. 
 
The Simons contend that Villegas is not persuasive 
because of our decision in Allen, 629 F.3d at 364.  Allen was 
a mortgage foreclosure lawsuit filed on a bank’s behalf 
against a borrower.  At the request of the borrower’s attorney, 
20 
 
the bank’s attorney sent a letter quoting the amounts needed 
to pay off the loan, fees, and costs.  Another letter sent the 
same day itemized the attorney’s fees and costs referred to in 
the previous letter.  The borrower filed a class action under § 
1692f(1) of the FDCPA against the bank and the law firm, 
alleging that the letters misstated the charges the borrower 
owed and that the charges were neither authorized by contract 
nor permitted by law.  The defendants moved to dismiss on 
the basis that the FDCPA does not cover a debt collector’s 
communication to a debtor’s attorney.  The district court 
rejected this argument but granted the motion to dismiss 
because a competent attorney would have recognized the 
charges as incorrect.  We reversed.  Noting that the FDCPA 
defines “communication” broadly to include “the conveying 
of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly through 
any medium,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2), we held that “[a] 
communication to a consumer’s attorney is undoubtedly an 
indirect communication to the consumer.”  Id. at 368.  We 
also held that the “competent attorney” standard did not apply 
to the debtor’s § 1692f(1) claim because “[t]he only inquiry 
under § 1692f(1) is whether the amount collected was 
expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or 
permitted by law.”  Id.  This inquiry did not turn on the 
reader’s sophistication.   
 
Allen did not articulate a competent-attorney standard 
for FDCPA claims arising out of communications to a 
consumer’s attorney.  But Allen’s reasoning supports 
rejecting the “competent attorney” standard for the § 
1692e(11) claim at issue here.  The inquiry under § 1692e(11) 
is whether the “mini-Miranda” disclosure was required in the 
Weinstein & Reilly communications and, if so, provided.  
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The sophistication of the party receiving the communication 
is irrelevant to that inquiry. 
 
Allen also supports rejecting the “competent attorney” 
standard for the only part of the remaining § 1692e(5) and 
(13) claims that the parties have raised on appeal.  These 
FDCPA claims are based on the allegations that the 
subpoenas failed to comply with Civil Rule 45, as 
incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 9016 in two respects: 
because they were not served on the Simons directly, as 
required by Civil Rule 45(b)(1); and they did not include the 
text of Civil Rule 45(c)–(d), as required by Civil Rule 
45(a)(1)(A)(iv).   Each claim requires two inquiries.  The first 
inquiry is whether the subpoenas failed to comply with the 
rules, as alleged.  The second is whether the alleged failures 
to comply also violated § 1692e(5) or (13) of the FDCPA.  
See LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1192 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e do not hold that all debt collector 
actions in violation of state law constitute per se violations of 
the FDCPA.  Rather, the conduct or communication at issue 
must also violate the relevant provision of the FDCPA.”).  
The District Court did not reach the second inquiry, and the 
parties do not address it on appeal.  Instead, the District 
Court, and the parties on appeal, focused on whether the 
subpoenas violated the Rules, and did not discuss whether, if 
so, that is enough to state a claim under the FDCPA.  The 
sophistication of the party receiving Weinstein & Riley’s 
communications is irrelevant to determining the subpoena’s 
compliance with Civil Rule 45 and Bankruptcy Rule 9016, 
which is the only inquiry before us on appeal.  The 
“competent attorney” standard is not relevant to this inquiry.  
The District Court dismissed these two remaining § 1692e 
claims on the basis of preclusion by the Bankruptcy Code, 
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without reaching the question whether, if the subpoenas 
violated Civil Rule 45 and Bankruptcy Rule 9016, that was 
enough to violate the FDCPA.  We will reverse the preclusion 
ruling without resolving whether the alleged failures to 
comply with Civil Rule 45, as incorporated by Bankruptcy 
Rule 9016, also state claims under § 1692e(5) and (13) of the 
FDCPA. 
 
 
 
 
c. The Allegations that State an FDCPA 
Claim 
 
In sum, we affirm the dismissal of the Simons’ § 
1692e(5) and (13) claims based on alleged violations of Civil 
Rule 45 and Bankruptcy Rule 9016 for failing to identify the 
recording method in the Rule 2004 examination subpoenas 
and for issuing the subpoenas from a district other than where 
the Rule 2004 examinations were to be held.   
 
The remaining FDCPA claims are the § 1692e(5) and 
(13) claims for violating Civil Rule 45(b)(1) by failing to 
serve the subpoenas directly on the individuals subpoenaed 
and Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iv) by failing to include the text of Civil 
Rule 45(c)-(d), and the § 1692e(11) claim for failing to 
include the mini-Miranda warning in the letters and 
subpoenas.  We now consider whether the Bankruptcy Code 
precludes those claims.  
 
B. The Relationship Between the Bankruptcy   Code 
and the FDCPA 
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Appellees argue that if any of the Simons’ claims 
survive dismissal, the Bankruptcy Code and Rules precludes 
them.  The Simons contend that there is no basis to find that 
the Bankruptcy Code and Rules preclude their FDCPA 
claims.  We have not previously addressed whether, or to 
what extent, an FDCPA claim can arise from a debt 
collector’s communications to a debtor in a pending 
bankruptcy proceeding.  The appellate and trial courts have 
reached varying and sometimes inconsistent conclusions 
about whether and when the Bankruptcy Code precludes 
FDCPA claims arising from communications to a debtor sent 
in the bankruptcy context.  Compare Simmons v. Roundup 
Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Walls v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002); and B-Real, 
LLC v. Chaussee (In re Chaussee), 399 B.R. 225 (9th Cir. 
B.A.P. 2008) (finding that FDCPA claims were precluded by 
the Bankruptcy Code), with Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 
726 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding the FDCPA claims not 
precluded).
7
 
                                              
7
    District court and bankruptcy court decisions addressing 
the relationship between the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code 
and Rules have proliferated over the last decade.  Published 
decisions finding that FDCPA claims were not precluded by 
the Bankruptcy Code include Gamble v. Fradkin & Weber, 
P.A., 846 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381–83 (D. Md. 2012) 
(postdischarge collection); Rios v. Bakalar & Assocs., P.A., 
795 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1369–70 (S.D. Fla. 2011) 
(postdischarge collection); Clark v. Brumbaugh & Quandahl, 
P.C., LLO, 731 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919–21 (D. Neb. 2010) 
(automatic stay and discharge injunction violations); Kline v. 
Mortg. Elec. Sec. Sys., 659 F. Supp. 2d 940, 949–51 (S.D. 
Ohio 2009) (inflated proof of claim); Bacelli v. MFP, Inc., 
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729 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1336–37 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (automatic 
stay and discharge injunction violations); Evans v. Midland 
Funding LLC, 574 F. Supp. 2d 808, 816–17 (S.D. Ohio 2008) 
(postdischarge collection); Dougherty v. Wells Fargo Home 
Loans, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604–06 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(postdischarge collection); Marshall v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re 
Marshall), 491 B.R. 217, 224–27 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012) 
(postdischarge collection); Atwood v. GE Money Bank (In re 
Atwood), 452 B.R. 249, 251–53 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) 
(automatic stay violation); Price v. Am.’s Servicing Co. (In re 
Price), 403 B.R. 775, 790 n.14 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009) 
(inflated proof of claim); Gunter v. Columbus Check 
Cashiers, Inc. (In re Gunter), 334 B.R. 900, 903–05 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 2005) (postdischarge collection); and Molloy v. 
Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., 247 B.R. 804, 820–21 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) (postdischarge collection). 
 
Published decisions finding that FDCPA claims were 
precluded by the Bankruptcy Code include Jenkins v. Genesis 
Fin. Solutions (In re Jenkins), 456 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 2011) (proof of claim for time-barred debt); 
McMillen v. Syndicated Office Sys., Inc. (In re McMillen), 
440 B.R. 907, 911–13 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (inflated proof 
of claim); B-Real, LLC v. Rogers (In re Rogers), 405 B.R. 
428, 430–34 (M.D. La. 2009), rev’g, 391 B.R. 317, 325–26 
(Bankr. M.D. La. 2008) (proof of claim for time-barred debt); 
Gilliland v. Capital One Bank (In re Gilliland), 386 B.R. 622, 
623–24 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2008) (inflated proof of claim); 
Williams v. Asset Acceptance, LLC (In re Williams), 392 B.R. 
882, 885–87 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (time-barred proof of 
claim); Middlebrooks v. Interstate Credit Control, Inc., 391 
B.R. 434, 436–37 (D. Minn. 2008) (proof of claim for time-
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barred debt); Pariseau v. Asset Acceptance, LLC (In re 
Pariseau), 395 B.R. 492, 493–94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) 
(false proof of claim); Rice–Etherly v. Bank One (In re Rice–
Etherly), 336 B.R. 308, 311–13 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(inflated proof of claim); Necci v. Universal Fid. Corp., 297 
B.R. 376, 379–81 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (postdischarge collection); 
Cooper v. Litton Loan Servicing (In re Cooper), 253 B.R. 
286, 291–92 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000) (inflated proof of 
claim); and Gray–Mapp v. Sherman, 100 F. Supp. 2d 810, 
813–14 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (inflated proof of claim); see also 
Jacques v. U.S. Bank N.A. (In re Jacques), 416 B.R. 63, 74–
81 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (proof of claim for time-barred 
debt); Wan v. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., 324 B.R. 124, 127 
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (failure to follow FDCPA debt-verification 
procedures).  Cf. Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 896 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (finding that issue preclusion prevents relitigation 
through the FDCPA of the amount of a debt after a 
bankruptcy court confirmed the proof of claim for the debt in 
an earlier bankruptcy proceeding).  Many unpublished 
decisions also address whether the Bankruptcy Code and 
Rules preclude FDCPA claims.   
 
Similar issues have arisen in cases involving 
bankruptcy debtors asserting violations of the Real Estate 
Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605 et seq., 
and Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.  See, e.g., Conley v. 
Cent. Mortg. Co., 414 B.R. 157, 159–61 (E.D. Mich. 2009) 
(RESPA applies in bankruptcy); Laskowski v. Ameriquest 
Mortg. Co. (In re Laskowski), 384 B.R. 518, 528 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. 2008) (RESPA applies in bankruptcy); Figard v. 
PHH Mortg. Corp. (In re Figard), 382 B.R. 695, 710–12 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (RESPA applies in bankruptcy); 
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 The Ninth Circuit has taken a broad approach, holding 
that a debt collector’s communications to a consumer debtor 
in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding cannot be the basis 
for an FDCPA claim.  In Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
276 F.3d 502, a debtor sued a bank for attempting to collect a 
debt that had been discharged in bankruptcy.  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the debtor’s FDCPA claim was barred 
because it was “based on an alleged violation of § 524” and 
consideration of it “necessarily entails bankruptcy-laden 
determinations.”  Id. at 510.  To decide the FDCPA claim, the 
district court would first need to address issues typically 
decided by a bankruptcy court.  These issues included 
whether the debtor’s payments were “voluntary” under § 
524(f) and whether she was required to enter a reaffirmation 
agreement under § 524(c).  Id.  The Ninth Circuit also found 
that the bankruptcy court’s contempt power allowed the 
debtor to enforce the discharge injunction, removing the need 
to invoke the FDCPA.   
 
In dismissing the FDCPA claim, the Ninth Circuit 
observed that a “‘ mere browse through the complex, detailed, 
and comprehensive provisions of the lengthy Bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
Payne v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. (In re Payne), 
387 B.R. 614, 634 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (RESPA applies in 
bankruptcy); Holland v. EMC Mortg. Corp. (In re Holland), 
374 B.R. 409, 440–43 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (RESPA 
applies in bankruptcy); Rodriguez v. R & G Mortg. Corp. (In 
re Rodriguez), 377 B.R. 1, 7–8 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2007) (RESPA 
applies in bankruptcy); Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Nosek (In re 
Nosek), 354 B.R. 331, 338–39 (D. Mass. 2006) (RESPA does 
not apply in bankruptcy); see also Jacques, 416 B.R. at 70–74 
(declining to decide the issue). 
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Code . . . demonstrates Congress’s intent to create a whole 
system under federal control which is designed to bring 
together and adjust all of the rights and duties of creditors and 
embarrassed debtors alike.’”  Id. (quoting MSR Exploration, 
Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1996)).  
The Walls court concluded that allowing an FDCPA claim 
based on a violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s discharge 
injunction would “circumvent the remedial scheme of the 
Code under which Congress struck a balance between the 
interests of debtors and creditors by permitting (and limiting) 
debtors’ remedies for violating the discharge injunction to 
contempt.”  Id.8 
 
In In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, the Ninth Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel similarly concluded that filing 
allegedly time-barred proofs of claim in a pending bankruptcy 
case was not actionable under the FDCPA.  Relying on Walls 
and MSR Exploration, the court found that “where the Code 
and Rules provide a remedy for acts taken in violation of their 
terms, debtors may not resort to other state and federal 
remedies to redress their claims lest the congressional scheme 
behind the bankruptcy laws and their enforcement be 
frustrated.”  Id. at 236–37.   
 
                                              
8
   The District Court noted that in In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 
452 (3d Cir. 2005), we cited approvingly the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Walls that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) does not create an 
implied private right of action to remedy violations of the 
discharge injunction.  Simon, 2012 WL 2891080, at *2 (citing 
In re Joubert, 411 F.3d at 456).  As the District Court 
acknowledged, however, we have not ruled whether the 
Bankruptcy Code precludes FDCPA claims. 
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In addition to this categorical basis, the Chaussee court 
also found that an FDCPA claim based on a proof of claim 
filed in a pending bankruptcy would create direct conflicts 
with the Bankruptcy Code.  The Chaussee court explained: 
 
[a]ttempting to reconcile the debt validation 
procedure contemplated by FDCPA with the 
claims objection process under the 
[Bankruptcy] Code results in the sort of 
confusion and conflicts that persuades us that 
Congress intended that FDCPA be precluded in 
the context of bankruptcy cases.  We fail to 
understand how [a debt collector] could comply 
with FDCPA § 1692g and its various notice and 
informational requirements because those 
provisions conflict with the Code and Rules.   
 
Id. at 239.  The FDCPA requires a debt collector to include a 
notice of the debtor’s rights within five days of the initial 
communication to the debtor.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).  The 
Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision prevents 
collection steps after a bankruptcy case is filed.  A debt 
collector could not satisfy the FDCPA by including the notice 
of rights in a proof of claim, because “a communication in the 
form of a formal pleading” is not an “initial communication” 
under the FDCPA.  If a debt collector had to send the notice 
of rights to a debtor in a pending bankruptcy case to avoid an 
FDCPA claim, that communication could violate the 
automatic stay.  To omit the notice in order to avoid violating 
the stay could violate the FDCPA.  This conflict was a 
specific, and narrower, basis for finding that the FDCPA 
claim could not proceed. 
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The Second Circuit reached a similar result in 
Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, but without 
taking a broad analytical approach.  The debtors in Simmons 
filed an FDCPA claim alleging that the defendant debt 
collector had filed an inflated proof of claim in their 
bankruptcy proceeding.  The Second Circuit held that the 
debtors had no FDCPA claim, stating that “[t]here is no need 
to protect debtors who are already under the protection of the 
bankruptcy court, and there is no need to supplement the 
remedies afforded by bankruptcy itself.”  Id. at 96.  The 
Bankruptcy Code provided both a mechanism to challenge 
proofs of claim and remedies if they were improperly filed, 
including by revoking fraudulent proofs of claim and by 
invoking the bankruptcy court’s contempt power.  Id.  But the 
Second Circuit noted that while some courts “have ruled more 
broadly that no FDCPA action can be based on an act that 
violates any provision of the Bankruptcy Code, because such 
violations are dealt with exclusively by the Bankruptcy 
Code[,] . . . we are not compelled to consider [that rule] in 
this case.”  Id. n.2 (citations omitted). 
 
 The Seventh Circuit in Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 
F.3d 726, took a different approach.  In Randolph, the court 
considered consolidated appeals involving FDCPA claims 
arising from attempts to collect debts that violated the 
automatic stay.  The district courts dismissed the FDCPA 
claims on the ground that they were “precluded” or 
“preempted” by the Bankruptcy Code.  The Seventh Circuit 
reversed, explaining that “[w]hen two federal statutes address 
the same subject in different ways, the right question is 
whether one implicitly repeals the other.”  Id. at 730.  Repeal 
requires either an “irreconcilable conflict between the statutes 
or a clearly expressed legislative decision that one replace the 
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other.”  The court emphasized that repeal by implication “is a 
rare bird indeed.”  Id.  The Seventh Circuit found no 
irreconcilable conflict between the FDCPA prohibitions and 
the Bankruptcy Code’s discharge injunction and automatic 
stay provisions, and no clearly expressed congressional 
statement that the Code preclude FDCPA claims arising in 
bankruptcy.  Although the Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA 
provisions at issue in Randolph overlapped, the court found 
that because “[i]t is easy to enforce both statutes, and any 
debt collector can comply with both simultaneously,” the 
FDCPA claim could proceed.  Id. at 730. 
 
 We will follow the Seventh Circuit’s approach.  When, 
as here, FDCPA claims arise from communications a debt 
collector sends a bankruptcy debtor in a pending bankruptcy 
proceeding, and the communications are alleged to violate the 
Bankruptcy Code or Rules, there is no categorical preclusion 
of the FDCPA claims.  When, as is also the case here, the 
FDCPA claim arises from communications sent in a pending 
bankruptcy proceeding and there is no allegation that the 
communications violate the Code or Rules, there is even less 
reason for categorical preclusion.  The proper inquiry for both 
circumstances is whether the FDCPA claim raises a direct 
conflict between the Code or Rules and the FDCPA, or 
whether both can be enforced. 
 
This approach is consistent with Supreme Court 
precedents recognizing a presumption against the implied 
repeal of one federal statute by another.  “‘[W]hen two 
statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, 
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the 
contrary, to regard each as effective.’”  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. 
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–44 (2001) 
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(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).  
“Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in 
drafting, and so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ 
between two laws, a court must give effect to both.”  Conn. 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Nor is “a statute 
dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject . . . 
submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more 
generalized spectrum.”  Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 
426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that “‘[r]epeals by implication are not favored and will 
not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to 
repeal [is] clear and manifest.’”  Hawaii v. Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009) (quoting Nat’l 
Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 
644, 662 (2007)) (second alteration in original); see also 
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003); Posadas v. Nat’l 
City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).  Courts should 
“not infer a statutory repeal unless the later statute expressly 
contradicts the original act or unless such a construction is 
absolutely necessary in order that the words of the later 
statute shall have any meaning at all.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders, 551 U.S. at 662 (alterations and internal quotations 
marks omitted); see also Branch, 538 U.S. at 273 (“An 
implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two 
statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, or where the latter Act 
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly 
intended as a substitute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
In contrast to its consistently strict application of the 
presumption against finding an implied repeal of one federal 
statute by another, the Supreme Court has shown a greater 
willingness to find that federal statutes and regulations 
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preempt state-law causes of action.  See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l 
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (applying 
conflict preemption because “compliance with both federal 
and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where state 
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 
1261, 1266 (2012) (applying field preemption “‘when the 
scope of a [federal] statute indicates that Congress intended 
federal law to occupy a field exclusively’” (quoting 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) 
(alterations in original))); Arizona v. United States, — U.S. —
, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (“The intent to displace state 
law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation 
so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it or where there is a federal interest . . . so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 
In Walls, the Ninth Circuit cited MSR Exploration, a 
preemption decision, to support finding that the Code 
precluded the FDCPA claims.  276 F.3d at 510 (citing MSR 
Exploration, 74 F.3d at 914).  But as the Seventh Circuit 
correctly noted, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on a precedent 
involving federal statutory preemption of a state-law claim to 
decide whether a federal statute precludes a federal-law claim 
is misplaced.   Randolph, 368 F.3d at 733; see also J.E.M., 
534 U.S. at 144 (rejecting the argument that “when [federal] 
statutes overlap and purport to protect the same commercially 
valuable attribute of a thing, such ‘dual protection’ cannot 
exist”). 
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We also note that the Supreme Court has applied a 
federal statute to bankruptcy suits despite the existence of 
another, bankruptcy-specific, federal statute covering the 
same ground.  In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249 (1992), the Court considered the appealability of a 
district court’s interlocutory order in a bankruptcy appeal.  
The issue was the relationship between 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292 
and 1291, which give appellate courts jurisdiction over 
district-court orders and final judgments, and 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d), which gives appellate courts jurisdiction over appeals 
from district courts’ final judgments in bankruptcy cases but 
is silent about jurisdiction over other appeals from orders.  
The bankruptcy trustee argued that appellate jurisdiction over 
interlocutory bankruptcy orders could not be proper under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292, because applying the general appellate 
jurisdiction statutes (§§ 1291 and 1292) to bankruptcy would 
make the bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction statue (§ 158(d)) 
superfluous.  The trustee argued that interlocutory orders 
were not appealable beyond the district court because § 
158(d) did not give courts of appeals jurisdiction.  While 
acknowledging that § 158(d) made § 1291 redundant in 
bankruptcy cases, the Supreme Court rejected the view that 
the courts of appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction under § 
1292.  “Because giving effect to both §§ 1291 and 158(d) 
would not render one or the other wholly superfluous, we do 
not have to read § 158(d) as precluding courts of appeals, by 
negative implication, from exercising jurisdiction under § 
1291 [or § 1292] over district courts sitting in bankruptcy.”  
Germain, 503 U.S. at 253. 
 
In Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 
(1994), the Court again considered whether a general 
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jurisdictional statute could apply when a more specific 
bankruptcy jurisdiction statute addressed the same subject.  
After filing for bankruptcy protection, a debtor removed a 
state-court suit to federal court under both the bankruptcy 
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), and the general federal 
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  In considering the 
state-court plaintiff’s remand motion, the bankruptcy court 
held that although the removal was untimely under the 
bankruptcy removal statute and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 9027, removal was timely under the general federal 
removal statute and § 1446.  The bankruptcy court concluded 
that, as a result, removal was proper and there was federal 
jurisdiction over the suit.  On appeal, the district court 
reversed, finding removal under both the general and 
bankruptcy removal statutes to be untimely.  The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the subsequent appeal for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction under §§ 1447(d) and 1452(b).  
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s dismissal.  
The Supreme Court found that § 1447(d) barred appellate 
review of remand orders regardless of whether the case was 
removed under the general removal statute or under the 
bankruptcy removal statute.  The Court explained that 
“[t]here is no express indication in § 1452 that Congress 
intended that statute to be the exclusive provision governing 
removals and remands in bankruptcy.  Nor is there any reason 
to infer from § 1447(d) that Congress intended to exclude 
bankruptcy cases from its coverage.”  Things Remembered, 
Inc., 516 U.S. at 129.  This conclusion was not affected by 
“[t]he fact that § 1452 contains its own provision governing 
certain types of remands in bankruptcy.”  Id.  Because 
“[t]here is no reason §§ 1447(d) and 1452 cannot comfortably 
coexist in the bankruptcy context,” the Court explained that it 
was required to “give effect to both.”  Id. 
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The Supreme Court has also been reluctant to limit the 
FDCPA because other, preexisting rules and remedies may 
also apply to the conduct alleged to violate the Act.  In 
Heintz, 514 U.S. at 291, an attorney sued in state court to 
recover money allegedly owed to the firm’s client.  The state-
court defendant sued the attorney in federal court, alleging an 
FDCPA violation for the attorney’s effort to collect an 
amount not “authorized by the agreement creating the debt,” 
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1), and for making a false representation of 
the amount of the debt, § 1692e(2)(A).  As noted above, the 
case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that 
the term “debt collector” includes an attorney who regularly, 
through litigation, attempts to collect consumer debts.  The 
creditor’s attorney argued that applying the FDCPA to 
litigation activity would create “harmfully anomalous results 
that Congress simply could not have intended.”  Heintz, 514 
U.S. at 295.  The attorney argued that § 1692c(c), which 
provides that a debt collector may not “communicate further” 
with a debtor who requests that the collector “cease further 
communication,” would prevent an attorney from suing a 
debtor, initiating settlement discussions, or filing dispositive 
motions.  The Court refused to read the FDCPA as 
prohibiting suits to collect debts.  “[I]t is easier to read § 
1692c(c) as containing some such additional, implicit, 
exception than to believe that Congress intended, silently and 
implicitly, to create a far broader exception, for all litigating 
attorneys, from the Act itself.”  Id. at 297.  The Court noted 
that many litigation activities would be authorized under the 
exception that a debt collector may “‘notify the consumer that 
the debt collector or creditor may invoke’ or ‘intends to 
invoke’ a ‘specified remedy’ (of a kind ‘ordinarily invoked by 
[the] debt collector or creditor’).”  Id. at 296 (quoting 15 
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U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(2), (3)).  The Supreme Court held that the 
FDCPA applied despite the availability during litigation of 
judicial oversight, due-process protections, detailed 
procedural rules, and remedies to curtail and punish improper 
actions by creditors’ attorneys.9  As the Seventh Circuit 
observed on remand, “[t]here is no stated exclusivity in the 
FDCPA as the means to redress collections errors.  State law 
sanctions (the equivalent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11) apply to 
defendants in their capacity as lawyers, and do so jointly with 
                                              
9
  In Heintz, the Supreme Court stated that it was abrogating 
Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18 (6th Cir. 1993), a Sixth Circuit 
decision finding that an attorney could not be subject to the 
FDCPA for actions he took in the course of litigation.  514 
U.S. at 294.  The Sixth Circuit had found that applying the 
FDCPA to litigation conduct would “contravene[] the 
elaborate control on lawyers’ conduct through the Rule 11 
process.”  Green, 9 F.3d at 22.  The appeals court noted that 
the trial court had discretion to order sanctions under Rule 11 
because a “basic inquiry would have shown that [the factual 
basis for the suit] was inaccurate.”  Id.  It explained that the 
mandatory relief imposed by the FDCPA would encroach on 
a trial court’s discretion under Rule 11 “to regulate its 
forum.”  Id.  The court concluded that it was “unwilling to 
impose a system of strict liability that conflicts with the 
current system of judicial regulation.”  Id.  The Sixth 
Circuit’s position in Green is almost identical to the positions 
advocated by the appellees in this case and adopted by the 
Second Circuit, in Simmons, and Ninth Circuit, in Walls.  We 
decline to adopt in the bankruptcy context the same positions 
that, in the general litigation context, failed to persuade the 
Supreme Court. 
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the Act.”  Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 
The appellees contend that another Supreme Court 
decision, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651 (1974), 
compels the conclusion that the FDCPA’s scope ends where 
the Bankruptcy Code’s begins. Kokoszka addressed whether 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s (CCPA) limits on wage 
garnishment would exempt from bankruptcy protection part 
of a debtor’s income tax refund.10  To be exempt, a refund 
would have to be classified as “earnings.”  The Court found 
that “earnings” “did not include a tax refund, but [was] 
limited to ‘periodic payments of compensation and [did] not 
pertain to every asset that is traceable in some way to such 
compensation.’”  Id. at 651 (quoting In re Kokoszka, 479 F.3d 
990, 997 (2d Cir. 1973)).
11
  As a result, tax refunds were not 
                                              
10
  Section 1673(a) and (a)(1) of the CCPA provide that “the 
maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an 
individual for any workweek which is subjected to 
garnishment may not exceed . . . 25 per centum of his 
disposable earnings for that week.”   
 
11
  The CCPA defines “earnings” as “compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, 
salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes 
periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement 
program.”  15 U.S.C. § 1672(a) (1968).  It defines 
“disposable earnings” as “that part of the earnings of any 
individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings 
of any amounts required by law to be withheld.”  Id. § 
1672(b) (1968).  “Garnishment” means “any legal or 
equitable procedure through which the earnings of any 
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covered by the CCPA garnishment provisions.  In interpreting 
those provisions, the Court looked to the CCPA’s purpose 
and legislative history. The Court explained that in enacting 
the CCPA, Congress sought to reduce the need for 
bankruptcy but did not seek to regulate the bankruptcy 
process: 
An examination of the legislative 
history of the Consumer 
Protection Act makes it clear that, 
while it was enacted against the 
background of the Bankruptcy 
Act, it was not intended to alter 
the clear purpose of the latter Act 
to assemble, once a bankruptcy 
petition is filed, all of the debtor’s 
assets for the benefit of his 
creditors.  Indeed, Congress’ 
concern was not the 
administration of a bankrupt’s 
estate but the prevention of 
bankruptcy in the first place by 
eliminating “an essential element 
in the predatory extension of 
credit resulting in a disruption of 
employment, production, as well 
as consumption” and a consequent 
increase in personal bankruptcies. 
. . . [I]f, despite its protection, 
bankruptcy did occur, the debtor’s 
                                                                                                     
individual are required to be withheld for payment of any 
debt.”  Id. § 1672(c) (1968). 
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protection and remedy remained 
under the Bankruptcy Act. 
 
Id. at 650–51 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
The appellees argue that because Congress passed the 
FDCPA as an amendment to the CCPA,
12
 the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion about the CCPA’s garnishment provisions 
applies with equal force to the FDCPA.  We disagree.  As the 
Seventh Circuit recognized in Randolph, the Supreme Court’s 
broad pronouncements about the CCPA’s relationship to the 
Bankruptcy Code were at minimum dicta and at most a gloss 
on the CCPA’s ambiguous definitions of “earnings” and 
“garnishment.”  Randolph, 368 F.3d at 731 (finding that the 
Supreme Court’s discussion in Kokoszka on the relationship 
between the CCPA and Bankruptcy Act was “not expressed 
as a holding”).  Unlike the CCPA’s garnishment provisions, 
the FDCPA “regulates how debt collectors interact with 
debtors, and not what assets are made available to which 
creditors and how much is left for debtors (the principal 
subjects of the Bankruptcy Code).”  Id.  As a result, the 
Supreme Court’s conclusions in Kokoszka about the 
relationship between the Bankruptcy Code and the CCPA’s 
garnishment provisions do not apply to the relationship 
between the Code and the FDCPA. 
 
Finding no broad categorical preclusion, we turn to the 
narrower question of whether the Simons’ specific allegations 
present such a conflict with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 
as to preclude their FDCPA claims. 
                                              
12
 Pub. L. 95-109; 91 Stat. 874, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1692–
1692p. 
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C. The Relationship Between the FDCPA § 
1692e(5) and (13) Claims and the Bankruptcy 
Code and Rules 
 
The Simons’ remaining claims under § 1692e(5) and 
(13) of the FDCPA are based on alleged violations of 
subpoena requirements.  Bankruptcy Rule 2004 permits a 
court, “[o]n motion of any party in interest . . . [to] order the 
examination of any entity.”  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(a).  The 
Bankruptcy Rules specify how a creditor is to issue notice of, 
and conduct, a Rule 2004 examination.  A Rule 2004 
examination may be used to cover a wide range of subjects 
relating “to the acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities 
and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which 
may affect the administration of the debtor’s estate, or to the 
debtor’s right to a discharge.”  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b); see 
also In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 840 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (“[C]ourts have recognized that Rule 2004 
examinations are broad and unfettered and in the nature of 
fishing expeditions.”).  “The court may for cause shown and 
on terms as it may impose order the debtor to be examined 
under this rule at any time or place it designates, whether 
within or without the district wherein the case is pending.”  
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(d).  If the party to be examined is a 
debtor, and the debtor lives more than 100 miles from the 
place of examination, “the mileage allowed by law to a 
witness shall be tendered for any distance more than 100 
miles from the debtor’s residence at the date of the filing of 
the first petition commencing a case under the Code or the 
residence at the time the debtor is required to appear for the 
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examination, whichever is the lesser.”  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
2004(e).  The District of New Jersey Local Bankruptcy Rules 
state that “[i]f a party from whom an examination or 
document production is sought under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 
agrees to appear for examination or to produce documents 
voluntarily, no subpoena or Court order is required.”  D.N.J. 
LBR 2004-1(a).  But a party that serves a subpoena for a Rule 
2004 examination and document production may compel 
performance under Bankruptcy Rule 9016 and Civil Rule 45.  
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(c) (“The attendance of an entity 
for examination and for the production of documents, whether 
the examination is to be conducted within or without the 
district in which the case is pending, may be compelled as 
provided in Rule 9016 for the attendance of a witness at a 
hearing or trial. . . .”); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9016 (“Rule 
45 F. R. Civ. P. applies in cases under the Code.”).   
 
To be valid, a subpoena must comply with Civil Rule 
45’s requirements.  As the appellees point out, even if the 
Simons are correct that the Rule 2004 examination subpoenas 
at issue did not comply with Bankruptcy Rule 9016 and Civil 
Rule 45, the Simons have remedies for such noncompliance 
available under the Code and Rules.  Under Civil Rule 
45(c)(2)(B)–(c)(3), a subpoena recipient may object or move 
to quash or modify a subpoena for several reasons, including 
that it fails to comply with Bankruptcy Rule 9016 and Civil 
Rule 45.  In addition, a subpoena recipient may seek 
sanctions under the bankruptcy court’s civil contempt power.  
See In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating 
that 11 U.S.C. § 105 provides bankruptcy courts with a 
contempt remedy); see also Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 
230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[Section] 105 provides a 
bankruptcy court with statutory contempt powers, in addition 
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to whatever inherent contempt powers the court may have.  
Those contempt powers inherently include the ability to 
sanction a party.” (citations omitted)).   
 
The appellees have not shown, however, why the 
availability of these bankruptcy remedies would preclude the 
Simons’ FDCPA claims for violating Civil Rule 45 and 
Bankruptcy Rule 9016 subpoena rules by failing to serve the 
subpoenas directly on the individuals subpoenaed and failing 
to include the text of Civil Rule 45(c)–(d) in the subpoenas.  
The Simons moved to quash the subpoenas in the Bankruptcy 
Court.  The Bankruptcy Court found the subpoenas defective 
and quashed them.  No conflict exists between these 
Bankruptcy Code or Rule obligations and the obligations the 
Simons seek to impose under the FDCPA.  A creditor may 
comply with the obligations of Bankruptcy Rule 9016 and 
Civil Rule 45 on the one hand and with the FDCPA on the 
other.  Nor is there a conflict between the remedies for 
noncompliance available in a bankruptcy court and the 
remedies available under the FDCPA.  The fact that the 
bankruptcy court has other means to enforce compliance with 
the subpoena rules does not conflict with finding liability or 
awarding damages under the FDCPA for violations based on 
a debt collector’s failure to comply with the subpoena rules.  
As a result, we reverse the dismissal of the Simons’ 
remaining FDCPA claims under § 1692e(5) and (13). 
 
D. The Relationship Between the FDCPA § 
1692e(11) Claim and the Bankruptcy Code and 
Rules 
 
The Simons’ claim under § 1692e(11) of the FDCPA 
leads to a different result.  The Simons alleged that the 
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appellees are liable under the FDCPA because the letters and 
Rule 2004 examination subpoenas failed to disclose that they 
were sent by a debt collector attempting to collect a debt and 
that “any information obtained [would] be used for that 
purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).  The Bankruptcy Code’s 
automatic stay provision forbids “any act to collect, assess, or 
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the 
commencement” of the bankruptcy proceeding.  11 U.S.C. § 
362(a)(6).  Several courts have held that sending a § 
1692e(11) notice violates the automatic stay.  See, e.g., Maloy 
v. Phillips, 197 B.R. 721, 723 (M.D. Ga. 1996); Divane v. A 
& C Elec. Co., Inc., 193 B.R. 856, 859 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 
Hubbard v. Nat’l Bond & Collection Assoc., Inc., 126 B.R. 
422, 428–29 (D. Del. 1991).  If, as the Simons argue, a 
§ 1692e(11) claim could arise from the fact that the Weinstein 
& Riley letters and subpoenas did not include the “mini-
Miranda” notice, the firm would violate the automatic stay 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code by including the notice or 
violate the FDCPA by not including the notice.  This conflict 
precludes allowing a claim under § 1692e(11) for failing to 
include the “mini-Miranda” notice in the letters and Rule 
2004 examination subpoenas sent to the Simons through their 
bankruptcy counsel.
13
 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
                                              
13
   We do not reach the question whether the subpoenas (but 
not the letters) are exempt from the § 1692e(11) notice 
requirements as “formal pleading[s] made in connection with 
a legal action.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).  That is, we do not 
decide whether a Rule 2004 subpoena is an initial 
communication under § 1692e(11).  
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We will affirm in part and reverse in part the District 
Court’s dismissal of the Simons’ claims.  We will affirm the 
dismissal of the Simons’ § 1692e(5) and (13) claims for 
allegedly violating the Civil Rule 45 and Bankruptcy Rule 
9016 subpoena rules by failing to identify the recording 
method in the Rule 2004 examination subpoenas and by 
issuing the subpoenas from a district other than where the 
examinations were to be held.  We will affirm the dismissal 
of the Simons’ § 1692e(11) claim because the mini-Miranda 
requirement conflicts with the automatic stay provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  We will reverse the dismissal of the 
Simons’ remaining § 1692e(5) and (13) claims for allegedly 
violating Civil Rule 45 and Bankruptcy Rule 9016 by failing 
to serve the subpoenas directly on the individuals subpoenaed 
and failing to include the text of Civil Rule 45(c)–(d) in the 
subpoenas, and we will remand. 
